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Civilian control of the military is a doctrine in military and political science that places ultimate responsibility for a country's strategic decision-making in the hands of the civilian political leadership, rather than professional military officers. The ''de facto'' opposite of having civilian control of the military is a military dictatorship. A lack of control over the military may result in a state within a state. One author, paraphrasing Samuel P. Huntington's writings in ''The Soldier and the State'', has summarized the civilian control ideal as "the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority". Civilian control is often seen as a prerequisite feature of a stable, liberal democracy. Use of the term in scholarly analyses tends to take place in the context of a democracy governed by elected officials, though the subordination of the military to political control is not unique to these societies. One example is the People's Republic of China. Mao Zedong stated that "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party," reflecting the primacy of the Communist Party of China (and communist parties in general) as decision-makers in Marxist-Leninist and Maoist theories of democratic centralism. As noted by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill professor Richard H. Kohn "civilian control is not a fact but a process". Affirmations of respect for the values of civilian control notwithstanding, the actual level of control sought or achieved by the civilian leadership may vary greatly in practice, from a statement of broad policy goals that military commanders are expected to translate into operational plans, to the direct selection of specific targets for attack on the part of governing politicians. National Leaders with limited experience in military matters often have little choice but to rely on the advice of professional military commanders trained in the art and science of warfare to inform the limits of policy; in such cases, the military establishment may enter the bureaucratic arena to advocate for or against a particular course of action, shaping the policy-making process and blurring any clear-cut lines of civilian control. == Rationales == Advocates of civilian control generally take a Clausewitzian view of war, emphasizing its political character. The words of Georges Clemenceau, ''"War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men"'' (also frequently rendered as ''"War is too important to be left to the generals"''), wryly reflect this view. Given that broad strategic decisions, such as the decision to declare a war, start an invasion, or end a conflict, have a major impact on the citizens of the country, they are seen by civilian control advocates as best guided by the will of the people (as expressed by their political representatives), rather than left solely to an elite group of tactical experts. The military serves as a special government agency, which is supposed to ''implement'', rather than ''formulate'', policies that require the use of certain types of physical force. Kohn succinctly summarizes this view when he writes that: "()he point of civilian control is to make security subordinate to the larger purposes of a nation, rather than the other way around. The purpose of the military is to defend society, not to define it." A state's effective use of force is an issue of great concern for all national leaders, who must rely on the military to supply this aspect of their authority. The danger of granting military leaders full autonomy or sovereignty is that they may ignore or supplant the democratic decision-making process, and use physical force, or the threat of physical force, to achieve their preferred outcomes; in the worst cases, this may lead to a coup or military dictatorship. A related danger is the use of the military to crush domestic political opposition through intimidation or sheer physical force, interfering with the ability to have free and fair elections, a key part of the democratic process. This poses the paradox that "because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection".〔Peter D. Feaver. 1996. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control." (''Armed Forces & Society'' ). 23(2): 149-178.〕 Also, military personnel, because of the nature of their job, are much more willing to use force to settle disputes than civilians because they are trained military personnel that specialize strictly in warfare. The military is authoritative, hierarchical, don't require much discussion and no dissention.〔http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html〕 For instance, in the Empire of Japan, prime ministers and almost everyone in high positions were military people like Hideki Tojo, and advocated and basically pressured the leaders to start military conflicts against China and others because they believed that they would ultimately be victorious. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Civilian control of the military」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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